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1In one witty formulation, God gave the easy problems to the physicists (Lebow et al., 2000)
Tentative outline
1. Introduction (incomplete and very preliminary).
a. Can theory help the historians?
In recent years, growth theory has turned to the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of
modern economic growth as a topic of research. For economic historians, for whom these issues
have been their bread and butter for over a century, this is a cause for jubilation. The issues are
complex and difficult, and they need all the help they can get. What better than from the likes of
Robert Lucas, Edward Prescott, Oded Galor and their colleagues, who had previouslydeveloped a
set of novel and highly sophisticated and influential tools to analyze hugely complex phenomena
such as the business cycles and th effects of monetary policy in elegant and powerful models?
Theory has to simplify reality and to make assumptions. It tries to establish causal
connections  between  exogenous  and  endogenous  variables,  to  establish  equilibria and the trajectories
that a model of the economy will follow on its way there. What is being explained here is, at some
level, rather straightforward. In the early nineteenth century, income per capita and a set of related
variables, started to increase dramatically in a small number of economies in the northern Atlantic
and European offshoots. In his long and detailed survey, Galor (2005, p. 177) raises the main
questions that he feels need to be answered, such as why there was so little growth before the great
takeoff, why previous technological advances had not resulted in similar growth processes, and what
the connection is between demographic changes and the growth spurts. Economic historians have
raised other issues that need to be addressed here, and which play a lesser role in the models
proposed by growth theorists: what was the role of formal and informal science (propositional
knowledge) in triggering the growth spurts? what advantages did Britain possess that awarded it a
leadership role, however ephemeral? what role did formal and informal institutions such as
government and independent NGO’s play in the process? what importance did colonial ventures and
overseas trade, both short- and long-distance have in the process? how did the interaction between
traditional sectors (agriculture and domestic industry) and the modern sector matter? Theory, it
seems to us, can help us answer all of those questions by focusing on the variables that mattered and
by pointing out likely and less likely causal connections, as well as by adding precision to the
analysis. 
But human history is far more complex than natural phenomena.
1 Theorists, by stripping
away parts of the problem, are presenting an important and much improved way to solve the
problem, but their models are not the magic wand that will solve the economic historian’s difficulty.
There are basically four reasons why unbridled optimism about the use of economic models in2
explaining the questions are probably out of place. One is the role of unobservables and intangibles.
As economists have become increasingly convinced of the importance of culture in explaining
economic growth (e.g. Tabellini, 2006; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2005), it is clear that our
ability to understand large-scale historical events in single models involving measurable variables
is somewhat limited. Second, economic growth consists of both shifts of the production function
(that is higher productivity due to technological progress) and shifts along a production function
(capital  accumulation and changes in allocation that increase output within a given set of
techniques). The composition of growth between those is, however, unknown and the interaction
effects between them make the story even more complex. Third, to the extent that the ultimate
process is driven by technological progress, our  understanding of economic growth will only be as
good as our understanding of what really drives technology. To do so, we need a much improved
understanding of the social and cognitive aspects of useful knowledge, the institutions generating
and disseminating innovation, and the political struggles between innovative entrepreneurs and the
incumbents (Mokyr, 2002). While progress has been made on these matters, there is still much to
be learned. Finally, there is the lack of observations: the great transition succeeded only once. To
be sure, there is a fair amount of cross-sectional variation between economies and regions that has
been exploited a great deal, but there was only one Industrial Revolution, and if that phenomenon
is to be taken — as it should — as the origin of modern economic growth, it really boils down to just
one observation. 
b. Unified models: pros and cons 
Do we need a single theory to explain everything? Scientists still keep hoping to come up
with a realization of Einstein’s dream of a single TOE (Theory Of Everything). This has remained
the holy grail of physics, and while it may one day be realized, it has not to date, and not for lack
of trying. In biology, too, we do not have anything that resembles a TOE, Darwinian models
notwithstanding, and it remains highly questionable if one will ever be found. If so, how likely is
it that one will ever be found in economic history? 
Perhaps the search is all that matters. Throughout the history of science, the world of
knowledge has been enriched by both “hedgehogs” looking for a single TOE and “foxes,” who were
content to deal with smaller problems. It is fair to say that economic history has been mostly a land
of foxes. The last (and possibly the only) great hedgehog was Karl Marx, whose TOE shaped the
field for many decades, but it was not really geared to deal with economic growth, and had next to
nothing to say about changes in demography and population dynamics. Yet an argument could be
make that there is a fruitful conversation between hedgehogs who see a “big picture” and point to
basic trends, and foxes who work on details, listen patiently to the hedgehogs and their grand
theories,  and then raise hard questions of detail, reminding the theorists of the complexities that are
always greater than the models can deal with. Yet without the hedgehogs the work of foxes would
possibly drown in a mind-deadening ocean of detail, without motivation or direction. It is this kind
of complementarity that makes the scholarly conversation interesting and useful. 
Yet we need more than that. Economic growth is the most significant event in modern
history, and must be counted as one of the truly significant turning points in history, comparable to
the emergence of homo sapiens or the rise of Christianity in the West. Understanding it, in the views
of many, holds the key to the economic fate of humanity. As Robert Lucas wrote in 1988, once you3
start thinking about this, it is hard to think of anything else. In this search, a single “unified” theory
of economic growth and demographic change is unlikely to satisfy the empiricists and details people
who are immersed in the fine details of how the patent office really encouraged or discouraged
innovation or who worry about the interactions between smallpox vaccination and other infectious
diseases. 
Unified growth is supposed to “unveil the underlying microfoundations consistent with the
entire process of economic development” (Galor, 2005, p. 219). But at what level? Presumably these
microfoundations must not only point to the human capital accumulation and the demographic
changes that accompanied development, but also point out how they did so. This question is still
quite far from being answered. The development of dynamic models with latent state variables in
which both the location and the stability of steady-state equilibria changes as a result of population
change, while ingenious, seems thus far less than historically verifiable. While they can reproduce
a number of historically observed phenomena (such as the discontinuities in output per capita and
non-monotonicities in fertility) they are far from the only way to account for these phenomena and
they leave little room for institutions and beliefs to determine much except second-order differences
in timing. Secondly, unified growth is supposed to account for both pre-modern “stagnation” and
the transition into sustained growth. Theories that account for just one of those periods are deemed
to be ad hoc. But methodologically we could have had a regime change or “phase transition” as
physicists call it, and separate accounts of the different regimes, so long as we could also explain
the regime change itself. Above all, unified theories tend to contain an element of inevitability and
“hindsight bias” that historians may find somewhat disconcerting. The potential for growth was
already present in latent form in traditional society and its emergence was just a matter of time. This
element of TOE is probably unattractive to historians who, like the biologists, know the importance
of contingency and accidental factors (“path dependence” if one wishes) in determining final
outcomes.
At the same time, however, the hedgehogs not only force the foxes to re-think their
assumptions, they point to those issues that researchers should be working on. In this particular case,
it is the connection between technological progress, the formation of human capital, and
demographic change that has been at the center of attention thanks to work in unified growth theory
(Lucas, 2002, Galor, 2005). Specifically, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on drawing
connections between growth, technology, fertility, and the investment in education. Economic
historians would clearly deny that this is all there is to the transformation, but by facing models that
imply that it was, they are forced to rethink positions and dig for more data or examine afresh what
they already have, and thus our understanding is advanced.
c. The riddles of growth: can we avoid Eurocentricity?
Historians have increasingly developed an antipathy to what they think of as “Eurocentric”
history, that is the kind of history that places the West on the pedestal of the successful economic
model of economic growth that other parts of the world needed to emulate. Such a history inevitably
asks questions such as “why did China (or India of Africa) fail to be like the West.” An entire
literature has sprung up debunking this approach. Yet when all is said and done, by 1914 a gap had
opened up between a club of economies that had achieved a high income per capita, and the4
2Adam Smith had no doubt that “the annual produce of the land and labour of England... is certainly much greater than
it was a little more than century ago at the restoration of Charles II (1660)... and [it] was certainly much greater at the restoration
than we can suppose it to have been a hundred years before” (Smith, 1776-1976, pp. 365-66).
correlates that came with that: longer life expectancy, more comfortable daily existence, and the
kind of military potential that made Western dominance possible.
And yet it is arguable that the question why did China fail to develop is, indeed, illegitimate
because what needs to be explained is not what failed to happen in China, India, Africa or the
Middle East, but the European Miracle (Jones, 1981). In this interpretation, the evolution of the rich
and industrialized economies in the West was a highly unlikely event, the result of a fortunate
concatenation of circumstances. Unified growth theory is willing to concede that accident may
determine the timing of economic growth but that the event itself was wholly preordained from the
day of creation. But how can we be sure? Many things could have wrong in the European
experience, starting with military events (e.g., the failure of the Mongols to devastate Europe after
the battle of Legnitz in 1241), the fact that the Black Death killed “only” a third of the population
but left the rest alive (unlike the demographic devastation of the indigenous populations of America
after 1492), the failure of the counter-reformation to suppress the reformation, and the rise of a free
and competitive market for ideas in Europe (Mokyr 2006). The origins of economic growth in
Europe, in this interpretation, far from being pre-ordained in the inevitabilities of unified growth
theory, are a fluke of history. Once it happened, however, its effects on other parts of humanity were
ineluctable. Whether one buys this interpretation or not may be a matter of taste; but there are few
tests we can bring to bear to discriminate between it and the models of economic growth that imply
that the roots of economic growth are to be found in European history long before it actually
blossomed.
Either way, it is hard to avoid the fact that the history of economic growth is Eurocentric.
This raises, of course, the question what it was about Europe that gave rise to the phenomenon. The
answer is hopelessly overidentified: we have but one event, and yet we are facing a huge range of
answers, from the silly (Christianity was the only religion that was suitable to economic growth, as
in Stark, 2000) to the geographically deterministic (Jones, 1981), to the superiority of European
culture (Landes 1997). Yet, to date, growth theory has been of little help in answering that question.
2. The pre-industrial economy
Many formal models of historical growth assume that before 1800, there was no or negligible
long-term growth (e.g. Hansen and Prescott, 2002, p. 1205; Galor and Weil, 1999, p. 150; Galor,
2005, p. 180). Some economic historians share this view (e.g. Clark, 2007, ch. 8-1).  At some level,
this statement is an oversimplification: there was far more dynamism in the pre-modern economies
than is supposed by theorists.
2 There can be little doubt that in Gregory King’s day (1688), income
per capita in Britain was substantially higher than it had been at the time of William the Conqueror
(Snooks, 1994). The growth rate may not have been high, but compounded over centuries, it
changed historical reality. While growth was not yet self-sustaining, living standards in Europe were5
3 Fogel (1990, 1994) argues that the bottom 20% of the population in France (and no group of society in Britain) were
too short of nutrients to work long hours. The remainder enjoyed ample consumption opportunities.
4In H.G. Wells’s utopian novel, Men Like Gods Utopia in the past “spent the great gifts of science as rapidly as it got
them in a mere insensate multiplication of the common life. At one time in the Last Age of Confusion the population of Utopia
had mounted to over two thousand million...” (ch. 5 part 4).
not at “subsistence levels” for most parts of the population, or even close.
3 Conventionally measured
growth rates may be revised upward if they are computed in a more encompassing way. New
products became available after 1600, and conventional measures of GDP tend to ignore both the
appearance of goods not previously known, the value of variety, and quality improvements. 
All the same, growth before 1750 was, if not totally absent, different in nature from what was
to occur in the nineteenth century. Degree is everything in economic history, and a rate of growth
of  0.1% or 0.2% is a very different phenomenon than one of 1.0%. Moreover, it was, on average,
far less steady than it was to become after 1850, with periods of fairly rapid medieval expansion
being punctuated with sharp and even disastrous declines caused by epidemics, wars, famines, and
climatic events. Just as in the developing world today, slow growth was also volatile growth
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997). Furthermore, pre-industrial growth was local or at most regional:
some towns and small regions such as London, Antwerp, the maritime provinces of Holland,
Southern Germany, Venice, and Tuscany experienced periods of high prosperity reflecting earlier
growth; yet growth at the level of “the economy” was rare, and perhaps is a concept that should not
apply, Adam Smith notwithstanding. 
In pre-industrial economies, even when growth occurred, it typically led to forces that
eventually extinguished it. Because of these “negative feedback effects”, output increased in spurts
– what Goldstone (2002) calls efflorescences. In contrast to similar episodes in the post-1820 period,
they did not last. One reason for negative feedback was the Malthusian mechanism, in which rising
per capita income produces population pressure that eventually forces wages back down. An
alternative  explanation  focuses  on  negative  institutional feedback, with growth leading to an upsurge
in the influence of rent-seeking that eventually causes stagnation.
a. The Malthusian model: theory and evidence
The economic history of the pre-1750 world is often referred to as the Malthusian epoch.
It is characterized by a model that relies on two assumptions: one is that, some exogenous shocks
excepted, population growth was governed by movements of income per capita. The other is that
income per capita was negatively related to population size. Together, these two assumptions imply
that whatever advances might be achieved by technological progress, capital accumulation, or gains
from trade, they will inevitably be frittered away through the birth and survival of more babies.
4 In
figure 1, birth and death schedules intersect at a wage W*. The technology schedule in the right-
hand panel then translates this into a feasible population size P*. If a temporary shock drives the
wage up to W’, death rates fall, and population starts to grow. Eventually, because of declining
marginal returns, this will force wages down to their previous level.  In the more extreme versions
of the model, this meant that little that could happen to these economies made much difference to
wages or population size – demographic responses pin down the long-run equilibrium. As Clark
(2007, ch. 2, pp. 22, 29) puts it, the Malthusian model implies that in the pre-industrial world tech-6
5Lucas (2002, pp. 14-15) describes how he came to see the empirical power of this theory as its ability to account for
the similarity in real incomes across different societies and the stability of living standards over time in the face of ongoing
technological change. Others who buy into this model, in one version or another, include...
6 Galor (pp. 183-184) shows some graphs that indicate that in pre-industrial Britain population and real wages moved
roughly in opposite direction and that crude birth rates and crude death rates were negatively correlated. 
Figure 1: A Malthusian model
nological progress produced “people, not wealth” and that “good government could not make people
rich.” The influence of this model on modern theorizing on the pre-industrial economy has been
substantial.
5 Galor (2005, p. 180) acknowledges that there were substantial improvements in per
capita income during the Malthusian period, but that accelerating population growth eventually
reversed all gains.
Is the Malthusian model a good characterization of the pre-modern era?  In the end, this is
a matter of the historical evidence.
6 Over the short run, movements in population before 1750 seem
to offer resounding support for the model.  The crucial idea here is that some variables like
population size are invariably slow-moving – and so will the real wage be. Yet mortality and
nuptiality can adjust even over the short run. High-frequency events like famines, wars and
epidemics had much smaller long-term effects than the disasters would suggest: a sharp decline in
population was normally followed by higher wages. Within a few years, unusually high birth and
low death rates would compensate for the initial decline in population (Watkins and Menken, 1985;7
7As Wrigley and Schofield point out, even if “for the individual it was better to be wealthy than to be poor if one
wished to live long and be untroubles by infection... for society as a whole the balance of advantage was harder to strike.
Increasing wealth bore an ambiguous relationship to improved mortality” (1997, p. 206). Yet not all cross-sectional evidence is
consistent with a positive relationship between income and rapid population growth. In 1954, G. Utterström showed that poor
and remote areas in Sweden nonetheless had lower death rates than the richer areas.
Watkins and Van De Walle, 1985). Patrick Galloway (1988) demonstrated that, in many European
countries, vital rates were responsive to grain prices in the way that the model predicts. Lee’s
original work on the Wrigley-Schofield population data showed nuptiality to respond (weakly, and
with a lag that stretches credulity) to wages, but life expectancy to be largely independent of the
wage. But the raw materials underlying these figures are imperfect, and there are serious conceptual
and econometric difficulties in testing the model. The real wage data computed by Clark (2005, p.
1311) replaces the traditional wage series computed by Phelps-Brown and Hopkins and is based on
a much broader array of commodities and a more comprehensive set of nominal wages. Both show
the same, rather miraculous sharp decline of wages in Tudor England between 1495 and 1575, a
decline that is accompanied by stable and then rising population as well as an unusually long life
expectancy.
An important problem in confronting the Malthusian model with the data is endogeneity.
Wages influence population size and vice versa. Without some source of exogenous identification,
there is no hope of pinning down the size and importance of relationships. Recent work by Kelly
(2005) suggests that weather may be a useful instrument for wages – the part of wage variation that
is driven by it is not the result of a feedback from population. Estimated in this way, there is strong
evidence that Malthusian  restrictions bound in England before 1800, with marriage rates reacting
strongly (and positively) and death rates strongly (negatively) to wages changes. Kelly’s findings
suggest that passing real wage fluctuations had a larger effect on nuptiality than on mortality.  This
implies that, in the short-run, the preventive check was stronger than the positive one, but both were
significant. However, we would need to estimate a full model, with feedback from population to
wages, to really confirm this finding. Cross-sectional evidence that richer Englishmen had more
surviving offspring also appears to attest to the strength of Malthusian forces in early modern
England (Clark and Hamilton, 2005).
7
However, Malthusian constraints probably mattered more over the short- than the long run.
Short-run demographic adjustments to real-income shocks may not imply that the “iron law of
wages” held true.  It is perfectly possible for the system to respond to high grain prices with
increased mortality and reduced fertility, and yet not to be in a long-term stasis. In figure 1, the
functions may be shifting so much over the longer term. At some point, if the death schedules, birth
schedules, and technology function shift enough, Malthusian factors will no longer be prime
determinants of living standards – even if short-run fluctuations seem to suggest that this is so.
Population was affected by long-term changes in background mortality, driven through mechanisms
we only understand very partially as a result of exogenous variations in disease environment and
climatic changes (Goldstone, 1991). If we are to believe the Maddison figures, all European
economies in 1700 were both more populous and richer per head than they had been in 1500. One
of the most spectacular cases is the Netherlands, where income per capita started to increase after
1500 with a corresponding population increase that lasted till 1650. But the population stabilized
around 1650 with income per capita being at a level that in no way can be regarded as subsistence.
De Vries and V.D. Woude (1997, p. 688) note that “by the end of the [sixteenth] century a8
8Oddly enough, the richest economy in Europe is also one of the last to start experiencing the population growth that
commenced elsewhere around 1750; in the Netherlands this did not begin until about 1815 (Hofstee, 1978).
conventional Malthusian model is no longer adequate to account for the economic and demographic
dynamics... demographic forces interacted with the economy in ways far more complex than can be
comprehended within a Malthusian model.”
8 
It may well be that, while the Malthusian adjustment mechanisms held in the short run, the
interesting shifts were caused by other factors. Rising income has traditionally been associated with
increased urbanization, to the point where the proportion urban has been taken to be a proxy for
income per capita. Cities, however, experienced very different demographic parameters than the
countryside, and had far higher mortality rates. Hence the curve D, which is a composite of rural and
urban demographic behavior, could slope upwards over some part of the w-D space because of this
composition effect. There could then be multiple equilibria: societies could fluctuate between one
state where population was large, wages were low, cities small, and aggregate death rates low, and
another one where wages were higher, cities larger, death rates higher, and population smaller. Cities
were the locus for much of the inventive activities of the time – the slow, gradual improvements of
machinery, of social organizations and the like. All of this may have improved the economy’s ability
to sustain more people at the same level of per capita income over the long run. City growth may
therefore have gone hand-in-hand with a slow, gradual outward shift of the technology schedule,
making higher wages compatible with bigger populations. In this case, Malthusian forces could still
dominate short-run changes, but the key explanandum would no longer follow from its basic tenets.
Some of the unified models also predict (modestly) rising living standards before the
Industrial Revolution. This is because of “the inherent delay in the adjustment of population to the
rise in income per capita, generated positive but very small growth rates of output per capita” (Galor
2005). In models such as Jones (2001), there is a similar, delayed response of population to
technological advances. Given that total fertility rates for females in many pre-modern populations
(and especially European ones) were substantially below their biological maximum, this is an
unconvincing mechanism to explain why living standards drifted up, albeit slowly, in the centuries
before 1800. Where population growth depended on economic conditions, such as in the relatively
“low pressure” demographic regimes characterized by the European marriage pattern, it remains
unexplained why, over time, fertility would have been curtailed at progressively higher and higher
levels of income – and that these restrictions broke down from the 1750s onwards.
In short, a substantial amount of evidence points to problems with the blind acceptance of
the Malthusian model as the description of preindustrial Europe. While Malthus probably
characterized some early part of pre-modern growth correctly, it is unclear how much the model
applied by 1700. The theoretical literature that advances this notion must be concerned with the
rather obvious cases in which Malthusian models did not hold or ceased to hold before the Industrial
Revolution. What Malthusian models involve is negative feedback: growth leads to higher nuptiality
and fertility and lower mortality, thus  higher population, which leads to lower incomes. There is
unanimity that this model is — roughly speaking — consistent with the absence of sustained growth
in (almost) all pre-industrial societies. But to convince us to take the Malthusian model as an
accurate description, it needs to be tested against alternatives.
b. Institutions and growth: an alternative to Malthus?9
9These had previously been possible both through the legal system – namely the Star Chamber – and brute force (such
as in the raid on the Tower of London, when the gold of goldsmiths was seized). 
One alternative mechanism that generates reversals of fortune is institutional feedback
(Mokyr, 2005). The particular idea is part of a broader class of models that sees political, legal and
social factors as prime determinants of long-run growth. Rent-seeking can produce negative
feedback, with prosperity leading to a host of institutional effects that end up terminating the effects
of technological progress or commercial expansion. The pre-modern economies faced a particular
dilemma, namely that the accumulation of wealth required on the one hand a strong government to
protect it from foreign rent-seekers, such as invasions, strict mercantilist policies, or pirates.
Moreover, as Epstein (2000) has argued, centralized nation states solved certain coordination
problems that societies with heavily dispersed powers could not resolve,  without which modern
markets could not have evolved.
Yet a powerful government itself could be the biggest rent-seeker or worse, farm out its taxes
to rent-seekers, break contracts, and seize assets. Ideally, a government should be strong enough to
protect trade and property from foreign invasion, yet constrained in what it could do to its own
citizens. This kind of combination did not emerge until the eighteenth century. Until then, rent-
seeking (from abroad or from domestic rulers)  time and again reversed the fortunes of those regions
or towns that had managed to accumulate significant wealth.  Examples of negative institutional
feedback are not hard to find, and until we know more about their relative importance, accepting the
notion that the economic outcomes before 1750 were mainly governed by Malthusian forces seems
at least incomplete. Thus in early modern Europe, less developed but large political units, such as
the young nation states of Philip II and Louis XIV, threatened the richer but smaller city states of
Italy and the Low Countries. This military imbalance created a basic source of instability and
inefficiency in the history of European cities. Economically successful but compact units were
frequently destroyed by superior military forces or by the costs of having to maintain an army
disproportionate to their tax base. The only two areas that escape this fate enjoyed unusual
geographical advantages for repelling foreign invasions – Britain and the Netherlands. 
If the institutional feedback mechanism turns out to have been important in the pre-1750
world, it would shed a very different light on the emergence of modern economic growth and its
roots. Much of the modern theoretical and literature assumes that what has to be explained is the
transition from a Malthusian to a post-Malthusian regime. In that story, demographic and
technological elements are modeled in various ways we shall see below. However, if the constraints
on growth before 1800 were as much institutional as they were demographic, the story will have to
be amended in important ways. 
Most interpretations of early modern Europe do no focus on this  negative feedback
mechanism to explain the intermittent nature of growth. Instead, the story is one of constraints that
falling away first in some parts of Europe, then in others. The single best-known statement in this
tradition was formulated by North and Weingast (1989).They argued that the Glorious Revolution
and the Bill of Rights in England did more than put government finances on a firm footing. Because
of the changes in the role of parliament and the increasing power for common law courts, the
monarch’s power had been very effectively curtailed and was widely viewed as such through
credible commitment. High-handed breaking of contracts and seizure of property came to an end.
910
10“An opinion of greater certainty as to the possession of property in these [republican] states makes [merchants]
undertake everything.… [T]hinking themselves sure of what they have already acquired, they boldly expose it in order to acquire
more…”. 
North and Weingast argue that, once property rights had been firmly established, risk premia fell.
Capital accumulation took off, and investing in new ideas became much more profitable. Eventually,
Britain’s growth rate took off. Many scholars have taken issue with this interpretation. Clark (1988)
showed that interest rates on private instruments such as rent charges did not fall after the Glorious
Revolution. Stasavage (2002) looks at public interest rates more closely and argues that the new
settlement was not stable for a long time, and that interest rates were as much determined by partisan
politics as they were by constitutional change. Sussman and Yafeh (2006) argue that wars and the
threat of revolution mattered a great deal for British interest rates, and that the new Hanoverian
regime was far from firmly established after 1688.
Following the work of North and Weingast, numerous scholars that have tried to use
institutional analysis to explain the divergent growth records across early modern Europe. DeLong
and Shleifer return to the argument in Montesquieu (1748) who famously argued that growth was
likely to be more vigorous in Republican states  which did not suffer arbitrary interventions by the
authorities.
10 They argue that absolutist rule was harmful because of three reasons – centralized
powers run by ambitious, powerful princes fought more wars, taxed more comprehensively, and
respected property rights less. They were also further away from the new trade routes to the
Americas and Asia. Only one of these channels is directly associated with the institutional
interpretation in its narrow form, and Delong and Shleifer cannot show that it is particularly potent.
Against their view is the arguments put forth by Another institutional approach is taken by
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005),” who argue that two of the channels identified by Delong
and Shleifer interacted in a particular fashion to strengthen institutions. Countries that had
opportunities for Atlantic trade experienced a gradual strengthening of bourgeois forces in society.
Hence, their measure of “constraints on the executive” in Britain and the Dutch Republic grew,
making it easier for these countries to overtake other European powers during the 17
th and 18
th
century. They also demonstrate that this improvement in the quality of institutions mattered for
growth – urbanization rates surged wherever geographically-determined “exposure” to Atlantic trade
was high. 11
Figure 2: Dispersion and Median Score, Constraints on the Executive, Europe 1000-1950 (line
shows median) 
Source: Acemoglu et al. 2005
Yet interpretations of Europe’s growth record that rely on institutions face as many
difficulties as does the Malthusian Model. To start with, the exact definition of institutions remains
a matter of some dispute. North defined them as “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral
and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of
maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.” Greif (2005) wants to include other modes of
behavior that create historical regularities.  In Greif’s model, beliefs and ideology act as “deep”
parameters that determine the efficacy with which society will set up the rules that make exchange
and investment possible. Yet there are few good theories that explain how institutions change and
why some economies end up with “better” ones than others. Standard measures in the literature such
as the (perceived) risk of expropriation, government effectiveness, and constraints on the executive
– can all easily reflect choices by governments, and may change quickly. For any theoretical model
that sees better institutions work wonders through capital accumulation, this would be problematic.
Glaeser et al. (2004) show that all three standard measures of institutions often change after a single
election. Presumably, property rights that are simply protected because of a dictator’s whim are not
worth a great deal. The volatility of these measures over time makes it less likely that they identify
some structural parameter of the political system. Other, more obvious variables such as judicial
independence, proportional representation, and constitutional review, vary much less and are more
likely to proxy for the structural constraints on governments that North had in mind. Yet in modern-
day data, the effect of these variables is small and insignificant. What is needed is a “deep”
parameter of a country’s political constitution that does not change quickly, and that is not simply12
11From the sixteenth century onwards, the Polish Sejm had extensive powers over taxes, legislation, foreign policy, and
the budget. Since 1505, the king could not pass legislation without support by the Sejm. From the end of the sixteenth century,
majority voting declined, and the unanimity principle began to be followed. German Emperors had little direct power outside his
own territory. Implementing any kind of new policy required the co-operation of the princes that ran most of the Empire. Getting
legislation through the Reichstag, the imperial assembly (consisting of the prince-electors, of dukes and other princes, as well as
the imperial cities), was very difficult. In 1648, the Emperor became formally bound to all decisions of the Reichstag. It is hard
to think of stricter rules to bind a head of state. Yet German urbanization and income growth rates largely stagnated, at least after
1600. 
12 For a recent critique of the revisionist argument, cf. Beik 2005. 
a reflection of current economic and political conditions.
For early modern Europe, the “constraints on the executive” variable compiled by Acemoglu
et al. successfully predicts urbanization rates. By itself, this variable does not explain whether
institutions will be successful . States with extensive checks-and-balances, such as Venice, the Holy
Roman Empire and Poland, indeed placed very considerable constraints on a monarch’s freedom of
action, and continued to do as long as they continued to exist. Yet they did not become hothouses
of economic dynamism. Other states in which the absolutist agenda was successfully carried out, saw
a significant reduction in the number of hurdles placed in the path of a prince’s wishes.
11 Even for
that epitome of absolutist rule, the Sun King Louis XIV, historians have largely rejected the idea that
his rule can meaningfully be described as an implementing a successful, far-reaching absolutist
agenda. For a generation, a new consensus inspired by the works of, inter alia, Georges Pagès and
Roland Mousnier (1970) has emphasized how much French kings at the height of absolutism still
governed through social compromise and consensus, maintaining the stability of a traditional society
and the influence of old elites for much of the time. Even if revisionism along these lines has gone
too far, as some have argued – it seems doubtful that the currently available classification schemes
capture enough of what is directly relevant to the argument that institutions and restrictions on
executive caused economic growth before 1800.
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The question is one of identification: one relationship between power and economic
development specifies that the government should commit to respect property and contracts, and that
this commitment should be made credible by placing adequate constraints on the government’s
power. Centralizing power by absolutist monarchs is what built the (militarily and politically)
successful nation states of Europe between 1500 and 1800. War was often an important catalyst of
these changes – in Tilly’s memorable phrase, “states made war, and war made states.”  Where
constraints on the executive were far-reaching, such as in the Italian Republics, military successes
could be few and far between and foreign invaders were able to destroy much of the wealth, in the
classic pattern of Olson’s “roving bandits.” In modern data, there is a robust, negative correlation
between military conflict and political instability on the one hand, and growth on the other (Alesina
et al. 1996).
For the early modern period, looking just at constraints on the executive may be a
misspecified model. As part of their struggle to field ever larger military forces, the modernizing
states of Europe had to overcome the interests of powerful groups within society, from local lords
to the church and the guilds. The constraints on many monarchs in 1500 were real enough. They
probably, on average, did not increase in Europe until 1800, and probably declined significantly in
some states. Yet most of the constraints of the executive at that point took the form of rent-seeking
groups ensuring that their share of the pie remained constant. None of the groups that offered13
resistance to the absolutist agendas of rulers in France, Spain, Russia, Sweden, and elsewhere were
interested in creating growth – nor did they ensure that sensible, long-term policies were enacted.
Put another way, if the Pagès and Mousnier revisionism is right then French absolutism failed in
economic terms largely because it did not succeed in implementing much of the absolutist agenda
because it was unable to control special interests. . Large parts of Europe’s early modern history read
like one long tale of gridlock at the hands of interest groups. Constraints on the executive, carried
to the Polish extreme, were not conducive to economic development – not least because they could
contributed to the disappearance of the state itself at the end of a sequence of grueling military
defeats. 
The example of the Venetian Republic is also instructive. In terms of its institutional setup,
it hard to think of a political entity that would more closely approximate the modern ideal. Property
rights were well-protected. Doges were elected officials, theoretically for life; in reality, subject to
good performance. A patent system was in place as early as the fifteenth century. Yet despite its
early riches and success as a sea power, Venice declined both as a military and as an economic
power. Few doubt that the events following the League of Cambrai (1516) were directly and
indirectly responsible for the demise of Venetian power and the eventual decline of its prosperity.
Today, constraints on the executive go hand in hand with lower probabilities of military conflict, as
democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other (and tend to win in wars against non-
democratic powers). In the early modern period, the correlations probably had the opposite sign. The
political entities with highly effective constraints on the executive quickly became victims of outside
powers whose rulers operated without being hamstrung by domestic opposition. The Thirty Years
War, made more brutal and protracted by outside intervention, ravaged the Holy Roman Empire of
the German Nation; Poland disappeared at the hands of Austria, Russia and Prussia; and the
Northern Italian Republics declined as outside powers – notably France, Spain, and Austria –
increasingly intervened. For early modern states, political stability and a chance to escape being a
victim of outside aggression may well have depended on pursuing an absolutist strategy. The effect
of “constraints on the executive” on growth will hence be a composite of the (positive) effect for
property rights, as well as the negative effects through the continued influence of rent-seeking
groups, and the (similarly negative) effects of political instability and military defeat. 
Constraints on the executive is an appealing concept for us today because it appears to be the
inverse of arbitrary confiscation of property, of the tearing up of valid contracts, etc. In the early
modern period, it often went hand-in-hand with the preservation of precisely the wrong incentives
for growth. If, as the institutions literature argues at a fundamental level, respect for property rights
and recourse to due legal process are key for economic development, then we need to construct
variables that more closely capture this dimension. A more comprehensive and historically
meaningful set of indicators should  measure effective, legal or customs-based constraints on the
actions of the executive or of local power groups – anything that makes it harder for might to be
right, without due recourse to the law. Instead of relying on the coding by a group of economists
whose immediate aim is to assess the importance of institutions, they should be compiled
collaboratively, by historians who specialize in the legal history of individual European countries.
Ideally, they should provide a differentiated measure of how secure property rights were, how
difficult it was to not only have access to legal recourse, but to actually win when in the right in a
law suit against individuals or groups in power, how easily constitutions could be changed by brute
force, etc. This could be complemented by a similar, collaborative data compilation effort that14
13Given that the earliest data are from the 16th century, there were only approximately 5-6 generations over which we can be
reasonably certain that this selection effect might have worked – not a great length given the modest reproductive advantage.  All
the same, recent genetic research has suggested that “evolutionary changes in the genome could explain cultural traits that last
over many generations as societies adapted to different pressures” (New York Times, March 7 and March 12, 2006). 
produces an index of (legally sanctioned, as well as illegal) rent-seeking in Europe’s early modern
states. 
c. Patience capital, natural selection, and other “cultural factors”
Since Max Weber’s work on the spirit of capitalism, culture is one of the “usual suspects”
that may determine wealth and productivity. Modern scholars (e.g. E.L. Jones, 2006, pp. 126-132;
Temin 1997) have concurred. The problem, of course, that culture means different things to different
scholars. Culture may be subject to evolutionary forces (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Galor and
Moav (2004) offer a model in which the crucial state variable that changes during the pre-industrial
period is not just population size, but “human quality” (genetic or behavioral). Households endowed
with more desirable human characteristics (education, the right genes, economically beneficial
attitudes) produce more surviving offspring and gradually but ineluctably change the composition
of the population. Therefore, the quality of the human population drifted up prior to the Industrial
Revolution. But disentangling “inherent quality” from changes resulting from responses to changing
incentives seems a formidable challenge. Also, natural selection normally need not increase quality
at all; it simply is adaptive to existing circumstances but utterly myopic, so that it is easy to see why
it may not result in any improvements.  Given that humans normally only start to reproduce in their
late teens or early twenties, any process that relies on natural selection requires a very long time-span
– or strongly divergent fertility rates.
13 Surprisingly, the Galor-Moav approach has recently received
some qualified empirical support Clark and Hamilton (2003) found that the rich and literate in early
modern England fathered more surviving children. Whether natural selection improved in some
definable dimension the quality of the population in the countries about to break out of the
Malthusian model before the 1700's is still far from an established fact. 
One other change in culture that may have had an impact on economic growth as well as on
the income distribution is the rate of time preference. In an innovative paper, Doepke and Zilibotti
(2006) argue that the rise of a bourgeois elite in industrializing Britain may be regarded as a surprise.
Before the transformation got under way, aristocrats had all the odds stacked in their favor –
available funds, political connections, access to education. Yet few members of the old political elite
actually got rich in manufacturing after 1750. Doepke and Zilibotti argue that this is because other
groups of society – the middle classes – had accumulated a larger stock of “patience capital”, that
is, a host of cultural practices and norms that make the delay of immediate gratification accepted and
expected. Through centuries of careful saving and investing, these groups had built up both financial
capital and valuable cultural traits. As the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution suddenly
offered greater returns to patience, the groups best-placed to exploit them were not the elite. In their
story, the absence of functioning credit markets is a key element in the story – only when financial
markets are segmented do returns to patience (adjusted for risk) differ across groups. They apply
their model to the decline of the aristocracy in Britain, generating an impressive fit overall between
their predictions and historical fact.15
14In addition to Clark and Hamilton (2006) cited above, we may mention the work by Herlihy (1997, pp. 56-57) and
Galor and Moav (2002). 
Yet the concept of patience capital arguably holds even greater promise. It may be no
accident that  the “nation of shopkeepers”, as Adam Smith called it, became the first to industrialize.
It offered an environment in which bourgeois values and practices flourished and gained in relative
importance. Clark’s and Hamilton’s result that wealthier Englishmen had more surviving children
could suggest that, instead of leading to an upward drift in some unmeasured, unnamed indicator of
human quality, it simply enlarged the share of those who had learned to save (and invest). Such a
change in population composition would also have contributed to the decline in English interest rates
since the Middle Ages ( Clark 1988), from 10-11 percent in the 13
th century to 4 percent by the 18th.
A gradual increase in savings, caused by compositional effects attained through the increase in the
relative number of those who were more patient, would be an alternative to the theories that attribute
the rise in savings to the “Calvinist Ethic.” The tendency of interest rates to decline in stable,
prosperous countries, noted by Adam Smith in the case of Holland, may not necessarily indicate that
technology was stagnant and returns to capital diminishing rapidly. It may simply be that patience
(and financial intermediation) was growing faster than savings could be usefully recycled into
investments. 
Compositional  change  can  also  help  us  understand  evolving  demographic  behavior. Behavior
often differs across subgroups, as both historians and economists have found.
14 Given that many
more children could have been fed, and that the constraints on fertility behavior were mostly social
and cultural (working through nuptiality rates), it is easy to see how evolving norms could have
changed population growth rates. Differential fertility behavior and evolutionary mechanisms might
thus explain how and why the Malthusian regime came to an end. In the Galor and Moav (2002)
model, for example, this is depicted as the gradual increase of the number of people with a strong
preference for “high-quality offspring.” As yet, we know far too little about the relative differences
in reproductive behavior and success in early modern Europe. Compositional change may have
played a large role, but at the current stage, it is hard to tell. What is needed is much more evidence
along the lines of the material gathered by Clark and Hamilton documenting differential fertility over
the long run. 
If Europe saw a rise of bourgeois values prior to the Industrial Revolution in terms of savings
behavior, it was complemented by a rise in work intensity and the length of the working day.
DeVries (1994) termed this change the “industrious revolution”. By the eighteenth century, even
Catholic rulers were abolishing holy days to boost labor input in their economies. Clark (1987) found
evidence that work intensity in the most economically advanced parts of Europe was much higher
than elsewhere. Voth (1998, 2001) argues that the workyear in Britain was already a long one by
1750, and that it increased yet further as a result of a decline in festivals, holy days, and the practice
of taking Mondays off (“St. Monday”). 
d. Long-run changes in the European economy before the Industrial Revolution:
underperformance or undermeasurement?
Before the eighteenth century, there are few output measures that could help us reconstruct pro-
duction per head. What we have instead are wage series as well as prices, plus some scattered infor-16
mation on rents on land and the like. The GDP figures compiled by Maddison and others are essen-
tially based on these wage series. Even the better ones rest on distinctly shaky foundations. Allen
(2003) is one of the more recent attempts to offer new and better series. Yet wage information is still
overwhelmingly skewed towards urban workers – a small part of the population at best. Price indices
are dominated by food items, and grain in particular. We have very little information on the price
or quality of clothing, of rents, and other essential items. As a result, some new revisions imply
changes in living standards over a century that are only half as big as earlier series suggested (Clark
2005). 
Yet even if we had perfectly measured wages and prices for consumption bundles of early
modern populations, we may be underestimating changes in living standards by an order of
magnitude. The main reasons are unmeasured quality improvements and the value of variety. As
Nordhaus (1997) has demonstrated in the case of lighting, big efficiency gains as a result of new
technology are often missed by traditional ways of measuring price changes. Increasing variety may
have brought benefits every bit as big. Trade, both long-distance and local as a result of higher
population densities and better communications, broadened the range of goods available to the vast
majority of Europeans. Between 1500 and 1750, Europeans of all social classes began to consume
large amounts of sugar, tea, cod, tobacco, cocoa, porcelain, and cotton goods. Potatoes and maize
made important changes in the staple diets. The effects of the range and variety of goods available
in the present-day US has been estimated to have boosted living standards by the equivalent of a fall
in prices by approximately 30% over the last 30 years (Broda and Weinstein 2004). Even the
comparatively modest trade before 1800 expanded the range of available goods greatly, boosting
living standards far more than GDP indicators show. 
3. The first transition: from Malthus to a new
economy.
Whether Europe in 1700 was still in the grips of a Malthusian regime, properly defined, is
open to question. In many regions, and over longer periods, population and living standards had
started to move up in parallel. To be sure, the changes were slow, sometimes temporary, and subject
to reversals and negative shocks. Nonetheless, it is questionable if all of European growth after 1500
could be regarded as yet another passing “efflorescence”. The timing and location of the first
transition, from a “traditional, slow-growth” society to a more dynamic society is hard to understand
based on modern unified growth models alone. Exogenous growth models treat the transition as
basically pre-determined by technology. In Galor-Moav, Jones and others that use endogenous
growth based on population size, technological change boosts population size, which then produces
ideas with greater frequency.
The rapid rise in population after 1750 in many European countries was to mark a far more
dramatic departure from earlier patterns. At the same time, output started to grow – living standards
remained constant or even increased slightly, where earlier patterns would have suggested a collapse.
This is the phase that Galor has termed the “post-Malthusian” phase. We implictly follow his
approach of dividing the Industrial Revolution as conventionally defined into two phases – an early
phas when population size no longer determines living standards, and a later, “Solow”-phase when17
technological change becomes rapid and is largely translated into higher living standards.
a. The meaning of the Industrial Revolution
Leaving long-term economic stagnation behind can be modelled either as a sudden
discontinuity with the past, or as a gradual acceleration over the very long run. In part, the difference
is one of framing the time span appropriately – compared to what happened in the millions of years
since homo sapiens left the African plain, developments after 1750 were very rapid indeed. If we
focus on changes over decades, the pace no longer seems very impressive – at least compared to,
say, growth rates after 1945. The discontinuity par excellence is the Industrial Revolution, but how
should modern growth economists interpret it?
The Industrial Revolution remains a pivotal event in the historiography of the beginning of
economic growth but its interpretation has changed considerably since the term was first coined two
centuries ago. IT was not the beginning of economic growth as such: It is now quite clearly accepted
that economic growth did not start during the Industrial Revolution and that its macroeconomic
effects did not become discernable until the second third of the nineteenth century. In part this is to
be explained by the fact that at first the Industrial Revolution affected only a small sector of the
British economy and that most economic activity still took place in slowly-changing “traditional
sector” even if the weight of the rapidly-growing modern sector was increasingly rapidly and the
exact boundaries of these two sectors remain in dispute. To this arithmetical truism we may add the
fact that the first Industrial Revolution was accompanied by three unrelated phenomena that
depressed economic growth, namely almost continuous war from 1776 to 1815 (with a brief respite
in the decade after 1783), the rapid growth of population that, in addition to increasing overall
population size, also increased the dependency ratio, and finally the succession of poor harvests and
high grain prices that struck the British economy between 1760 and 1816. 
Despite the absence of growth itself, the Industrial Revolution remains the transition from
the slow-growing economy of the early modern period to the faster growth of the post 1830 period.
In one classic formulation, it was neither the age of steam, nor of cotton, nor of iron, it was the age
of progress. Technological progress took place over too many fronts to be simply waved off as a
local fluke in the cotton industry, as some historians (Clark) have done. What mattered above all was
not so much the famous “wave of gadgets” of the 1760s and 1770s, but the fact that the process did
not fizzle out once it had built a number of successful designs. It is perfectly possible to envisage
a world of mules and stationary low-pressure steam engines crystallizing and settling down at a new,
somewhat higher, technological equilibrium. That this did not happen is the key to the emergence
of modern growth, even if that growth came properly speaking after the Industrial Revolution was
complete.
A full explanation of this phenomenon cannot be attempted here (but see Mokyr 2006, 2007).
The summary is something as follows. The Industrial Revolution, though it took place first in
Britain, was really a Western European “joint project” in which British inventors collaborated with
inventors and scientists from the European Continent and North America. In doing so, the Western
World depended on changes not only in economic circumstances such as a higher living standard
and a more commercially integrated environment in 1750 than in 1500, but also on changes in the
mind-set of its elites. Among those changes in mind-set, the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century
is central. The Enlightenment advocated explicitly the changing the agenda of scientific research to18
15The Swiss visitor de Saussure had noticed already in the 1720s that “English workmen are everywhere renowned, and
justly. They work to perfection, and though not inventive, are capable of improving and of finishing most admirably what the
French and Germans have invented" (de Saussure, 1902, p. 218, letter dated May 29, 1727). David Hume [1758, (1985)], p. 328
pointed out (with some exaggeration) that “every improvement which we have made [in the past two centuries] has arisen from
our imitation of foreigners... Notwithstanding the advanced state of our manufacturers, we daily adopt, in every art, the
inventions and improvements of our neighbours.” 
suit the needs of the economy. In this endeavor, the inspiration came from the Baconian program,
implemented first by the Royal Society and subsequently by scores of organizations, academies, and
informal groups. Moreover, the Enlightenment movement explicitly advocated the dissemination of
knowledge to those who might be able to use it best, through books as well as through informal
contacts in which tacit knowledge could be transferred. As a result, the connections between people
of science (“natural philosophers”) on the one hand and inventors, mechanics, and engineers on the
other was much closer in 1820 than it had been in 1680. 
Moreover, the Enlightenment brought about a slow but indisputable fading of the rent-
seeking institutions of the ancien régime. By 1820 rent-seeking had been sufficiently weakened that
the institutional feedback discussed above was made inoperative. European nations that were getting
wealthy were no longer in fear of being invaded by a predatory power, and within most western
countries, governments were constrained in the amount of resources they could expropriate from
their citizens. Moreover, exclusionary organizations such as guilds, or rent-creating obstacles such
as internal (and increasingly external) tariffs were weakened during the first half of the nineteenth
century. This triumph of liberal politics inspired by classical political economy — the
Enlightenment’s proudest offspring— no matter how temporary, was necessary to lift the West over
“the hump”. 
It is a somewhat separate literature why this process started in and was most successful in
Britain. Britain was peaceful (at least in the sense that no fighting took place on its soil) and that it
had a government that had discovered a way of changing institutions peacefully through the
emergence of meta-institutions that could change the rules of the economic game legitimately (in
the sense of them being accepted even by those at the losing end of the stick). To that we can add
the fortunate resource situation in Britain such as the availability of high-quality coal, and the
presence of a substantial cadre of highly skilled craftsmen on whose technical dexterity the
implementation of new techniques depended. Its more conducive political climate and the existence
of complementary resources ensured that Britain could take advantage of its own inventions as well
as those of others.
15 
Yet this advantage was temporary. By 1830, when this process had run its course, the gap
between Britain and the Continent began to show signs of narrowing, yet instead of Britain being
pulled down to the slower rate of development of the Continent, the growth of income began to
spread to the rest of Western Europe. By that time modern economic growth, rapid and sustainable,
could truly commence.
  
b. Endogenous growth: did size matter?
Early models such Kremer’s (1993) paper modeled the transition from “Malthus to Solow”
as one long, gradual acceleration of growth rates. Kremer’s model assumes that more people spell19
16It is indeed striking that prior to the rise of the British economy to the fore, Europe’s most successful economies
tended to be city states (Hicks, 1969, p. 42). City states, with high density but relatively overall small populations  had an
advantage in solving the problems of setting up effective institutions of commerce and finance. Market size was less of a
problem in part because the fixed costs of setting these institutions up were not all that high, and because they tended to be open
economies. The main source of economies of scale was not economic but military. Military power depended on total income and
population.
17 Some later models in the spirit of Kremer, such as Jones (2001), attempt to provide a solution to this problem by
assuming increasing returns in the production of goods and by allowing the number of new ideas to be a function of
the existing stock of ideas.
faster technological change since the probability to have a bright idea is more or less constant.
Kremer showed that some of the basic predictions derived from such an endogenous growth model
driven by population size hold both over time and in cross-sections – since one million BC, growth
rates of population can be predicted from the current size of the population. Also, geographically
separated economic units with greater surface areas produced bigger populations and higher
densities. Demographic transitions, with fertility responding negatively to higher incomes above
some threshold level, avoid the model from exploding. This assumption is also critical in the
dynamics of Galor and Weil (2000) where any technological change in the Malthusian world leads
just to population growth, but once population exceeds a critical level, it begins to change the
model’s equilibrium. Yet a direct nexus between population size and technological progress is
historically problematic. 
As Crafts (1995) has pointed out, the implications for the cross-section of growth in Europe
are simply not borne out by the facts – bigger countries did not grow faster.
16 Even if we substitute
population with factors like market size, which might have influenced the demand for innovation,
the contrasting growth records of Britain and France are hard to square with endogenous growth
models.
17 It is, of course, quite disturbing that in 1750, on the eve  of the Industrial Revolution,
Briain had just experienced half a century of virtual demographic stagnation. One might also point
out that if population size is critical and that it is population growth that “liberates” Malthusian
economies from their stagnation, China, where population grew from 130 million in 1650 to 420
million in 1850 yet where no Industrial Revolution could be discerned, should be of some concern.
Also, while the Kremer model can account for global growth rates prior to 1700, it strongly
underpredicts growth thereafter. Perhaps more seriously, there is a problem of identification here:
growth may have accelerated in some parts and period as a result of factors unrelated to the
hypothesized population-size-innovation mechanism. As more resources became available,
demographic growth accelerated. The simple correlation of population size and growth rates is not
a proof of the underlying endogenous growth model; indeed it could just as well be taken to be a
confirmation of the Malthusian model. Modeling alternatives are needed if we want to account for
the speed of growth after 1700, as well as for the variation between countries. 
A second class of models in which size matters takes technological change to be exogenous,
and models a set of conditions under which new techniques will be adopted. Early models in the
tradition of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also relied on demand effects, and hence the size
of economies, to explain when a “big push” might occur. In order to pay the fixed cost necessary for
adopting modern production, demand needs to be sufficiently high. In typical “big push” models,
this is only the case if a whole range of industries industrializes. The chances of this occurring20
increase with total output. One implication of these models is that industrialization may have been
feasible long before it got underway – if only everybody had decided to invest earlier in fixed-cost
technology, profits would have been high enough to justify the expense. Simple co-ordination failure
can thus undermine the transition to modern technology. Possible modifications and extensions of
this approach also assign a role to the income distribution and the structure of demand. 
Models in the “big push” tradition run into similar problems as population-based endogenous
growth; the European experience after 1700 does not suggest that absolute size of economies is a
good predictor of the timing of industrialization. Moreover, most of the technologies adopted during
the Industrial Revolution required only limited up-front investment, and were often financed by
retained earnings or informal credit networks. Before the late nineteenth century, fixed costs  were
typically small in manufacturing. When it comes to production technology with high fixed costs,
adoption decisions after 1870 could possibly be explained by the big-push framework. Yet by that
point in time, international trade was already doing much to break down the link between the size
of the domestic economy and the possibility of technology adoption. If there were large fixed costs
before 1870 they were in infrastructure, not in manufacturing. Yet these infrastructural investments
— canals, turnpikes, harbors— do not appear to have suffered a great deal from capital scarcity, the
Bubble Act notwithstanding (Michie, 2001). 
Indivisibilities also play a crucial role for models that put risk diversification at the heart of
adoption decisions. Acemoglu-Zilibotti (1997) argue that at low levels of development, the volatility
of growth rates is high. Households need to diversify their investments. Productive projects require
substantial setup costs. In order to invest in them, households need to rich enough – otherwise, they
would end up putting “all of their eggs in one basket”. Here, industrialization effectively depends
on a number of lucky draws. It also has the feature that, since households do not take into account
the effect of their investment decisions on aggregate productivity, industrialization may be delayed
because of a co-ordination failure. The model is attractive in that it incorporates a stochastic
component – industrialization may partly be the result of chance. Not every aspect of actual
industrial transformations is fraught with meaning – and the country that actually went first could
simply have been lucky. Yet the size of most industrialization projects was relatively small – even
the largest textile mills, had they been financed by a single person, hardly represented a large risk
concentration for modestly wealthy individuals.
In  exogenous growth models technology just happens and adoption decisions no longer are
modelled explicitly and size itself no longer affects technology or productivity change. In one
example, Hansen and Prescott (2002) argue that technological change in both the land-using
(diminishing returns) and the non-land-using mode of production was exogenously given and
constant. They assume that over the course of each generation of 35 years duration, productivity
increased by 3.2 percent in the “Malthus sector” (i.e. agriculture, where labor is subject to declining
marginal returns) and by 52 percent in the “Solow sector” (where all factors of production are
reproducible). Initially, only the Malthus technology is used. Eventually, as the productivity of the
unused technology increases exponentially, the Solow technology becomes competitive and is
adopted. In this setup, an Industrial Revolution is inevitable, and does not depend on anything other
than the growth rates of productivity chosen for the calibration. It is also difficult to square with
European economic history as a whole, as well as with the differences between countries. At the
point in time when overall growth rates began to accelerate, both the land-using sector as well as the
industrial sector became more productive – according to some measures, at relatively similar rates21
18 The only obvious alternative is to posit differential rates of productivity increase in the Solow sector, which would
rather be a way of assuming the result.
19 Wrigley (1983) showed that without mortality decline, 18C growth would have accelerated by 1.25 percent; without
fertility change, growth would have improved by 0.5 percent. This implies that over 70 percent of the acceleration was driven by
changes in fertility. Wrigley and Schofield (1997) qualify these conclusions to some extent, finding a faster decline in mortality,
but the relative rankings are unlikely to change significantly. 
20It also suggests that separating institutional factors from the Malthusian model is a serious simplification, because the
Poor Law played an important role in cushioning the impact of high food prices on demographic behavior (Post, 1990). 
(Crafts 1985). By definition, the model has nothing to say about which country industrialized first,
and why – the entire world is its unit of observation.
18 
c. Changes in demographic dynamics before 1830
One of the biggest challenge in interpreting the history of growth in Europe before 1850
comes is the rather sudden increase in population growth in Europe in the second half of the
eighteenth century, after a period of stagnation in the first half. The latest revisions of the Wrigley-
Schofield (1997) English population estimates reinforce the impression that fertility increases
dominated as a cause of more rapid growth; mortality played a role, but it was responsible for only
about one third of the acceleration.
19 Regardless of whether one accepts Wrigley and Schofield’s
interpretation of the Malthusian model, it seems that by 1750 the old demographic regime was
breaking down.The work of Patrick Galloway (1988) shows that in the middle of the eighteenth
century the short-term behavior of  British vital rates was no longer very responsive to changes in
prices. This suggests that in contrast with the arguments of growth theorists, the Malthusian regime
was falling apart before the Industrial Revolution and not as a response to it.
20 The unsolved question
to date is why. 
The rise of population that took place without a collapse in per capita incomes may have
generated positive externalities of another kind. Regardless if size mattered to the generation or
adoption of new technology, as the endogenous growth models suggest, the oldest and in some ways
most elementary of mechanisms – a simple increase in the division of labor as a result of greater
population size and density – could also have contributed to an acceleration in output growth. Kelly
(1997) presents a model of “Smithian growth” where trade integration is furthered by improvements
in transport infrastructure, leading to an acceleration of growth. He applies this model to Sung
dynasty China. Similarly, in Europe, higher population densities and greater economies generated
the scope for positive externalities, partly through improvements in turnpikes and canals (Bogart
2005a, 2005b). 
Regardless of what the sudden population spurt did, it leaves as yet unexplained how and
why it happened. Models that link population dynamics to technological progress itself, such as
Galor and Weil (2000), run into timing problems, namely that population growth started in the mid-
eighteenth century, before any serious impact of technological change on output per capita can be
discerned. It remains therefore unexplained itself.  If there is any challenge left to economic theory
in explaining big events in history, this development is a prime candidate. The challenge is
compounded by three complicating factors. One is that even in Britain, the demographic transition22
21In Cervellati and Sunde (2005) the relationship between mortality and human capital investment is explicitly
modelled. This is a little explored aspect of modernization, but one that was historically of some importance. All other things
equal, longer life expectancy would encourage investment in human capital, although it is important to emphasize that a
reduction in infant mortality would not directly bring this about, because decisions about human capital are made later in life.
Increases in life expectancy at age 10 or so are more relevant here. A second relationship in this model is that life expectancy
itself depends on the level of education of the previous generation: better educated parents will be better situated to help their
children survive. 
started before the Industrial Revolution could have possibly have affected living standards. Second,
the demographic revolution seems to have spread through many parts of Europe, regardless of their
level of industrialization and that the speed and nature of the industrialization process seem to have
been unaffected by the decline in mortality. Third, the mechanism through which population
increased seems to have differed from country to country, in some such as Britain increases in
fertility and mortality accounting for about half the growth each, whereas elsewhere birth rates
stayed constant or even declined from an early date, as they did in France. Models that link birth and
death rates in the economy are hard to construct, in part because they not only respond quite
differently to economic and environment shocks, but also because they affect one another in complex
manners. Significant progress in this area has been made in two path-breaking papers by Sunde and
Cervellati (2005, 2006).
21 It seems plausible to link declines in mortality to human capacity to fight
disease through more educated people who led more hygienic lives, breastfed their children, and had
access to medical care. Yet the historians will point out that mortality in this period was probably
dominated by a single foruitous event, the discovery of smallpox vaccination (e.g., Mercer, 1990),
and most of the impact of education on mortality was offset by the urbanization than accompanied
industrialization, leading in fact to heightened mortality rates (Huck, 1995). 
d. Institutions and the Industrial Revolution: 
Much of the modern debate about growth centers on the relative importance of institutions versus
human capital (Glaeser et al. 2004, Acemoglu and Johnson 2004). In cross-sections of countries from
the late 20
th century, constraints on the executive tend to be positively correlated with higher per
capita output. Because of the potential for reverse causation – with higher output improving
institutional quality -- work on modern data has principally focused on finding an exogenous factor
that affect institutions, but not economic outcomes.  One such factor that has been used with great
success is historical settler mortality. In a series of papers, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)
show that countries in which white settlers had a high chance of survival ended up with more
desirable institutional arrangements. They are also markedly richer, making it much more likely that
the link between institutions and efficiency is causal. Despite some challenges to the quality of the
data, the basic relationship appears to be robust. What is subject to vigorous debate is its meaning.
By far the best research on the importance of institutions in European economic development has
been carried out in the context of medieval and early modern Europe (Greif, 2005), and surprisingly
no detailed work to date has been carried out to explain the British Industrial Revolution. 
Three observations to summarize the importance of institutions in the post-1750 transformation
of Europe are in order. One is that throughout Western Europe we observe after 1750 a rising tide
against the rent-seeking institutions that are associated with the mercantilist ancien régime (Mokyr,23
22This parameter B in Jones’s model defines the proportion of total income that accrues to those who are employed in
the “ideas-sector” and in equilibrium equals the fraction of labor in the economy allocated to producing new ideas.
23The literature on the operation of the patent system in Britain is quite large, for an introduction see Dutton (1984) and
MacLeod (1988).
2006). The roots of this reaction involve some combination of the changing political influence of
economic elites and the influence of a more liberal ideology. Second, these changes in most cases
had to be imposed through political violence (in the United States and France). The only apparent
exception is Britain, where the meta-institutions such as Parliament could adapt to changing
circumstances and beliefs and reform the system peacefully and without major upheavals. Yet even
here it could be argued that the settlement following the Glorious Revolution would not have been
possible without the bloodshed of the Civil War. Third, as we have seen earlier, the precise
mechanisms through which “better” institutions affect economic growth are yet to be specified. The
leading candidates are “law and order” and the efficient protection of property rights, the provision
of public goods, acting as a coordinating and standard-setting agent, and the direct encouragement
of the knowledge-producing sector.
One of the more interesting institutional aspects of the Industrial Revolution is the importance
of IPR’s in the early stages of technological progress. Jones (2001) is the only growth paper to date
that models this important institutional parameter directly, and it turns out to play a pivotal role in
his model in whether the Industrial Revolution was “inevitable.”
22  Modeling the production of “new
ideas” is of course one of the hardest things to do in growth models, and macroeconomic models
have had to simplify away much of this historical richness. Thus the literature cannot deal with the
high riskiness of the inventive process, in which investing in the “ideas-producing” sector is more
akin to purchasing a lottery ticket than to choosing an occupation. Perhaps more interesting is the
failure of these model to recognize the different ways of assigning property rights in the two separate
segments of the “ideas-sector.” Whereas prescriptive knowledge, that is, techniques, could be
patented and thus be allocated some form of property-rights, this was never done with propositional
knowledge in which priority credit assigned to the owner did not include exclusionary rights. Yet
it is hard to understand the growth of technology during the Industrial Revolution and after without
explicitly recognizing the feedback between these two forms of knowledge (Mokyr, 2002; see also
David and Dasgupta, 1994). Finally, it would be a mistake to identify IPR’s during the Industrial
Revolution with the patent system as such. The operation of the patent system awarded monopolies
to inventors, yet infringements and other failures of the system implied that first-mover advantages
and old-fashioned government prizes  were as important as the rents earned by inventors.
23 As Khan
and Sokoloff (1998) have shown, the British patent system was far less accessible and user-friendly
than the corresponding U.S. system, and yet this does not seem to have affected British technological
leadership before 1850. 
e. Human and physical capital in the Industrial Revolution: theory and evidence
The most influential class of formal models created in the past decade sees the Industrial
Revolution as largely synonymous with the demographic transition and an increasing role for human
capital. Becker, Murphy and Tamura model an economy without a fixed factor of production.24
Improvements in human capital in turn directly feed into higher output. Human capital is produced,
it is assumed, by investments of parental time. Parents maximize their own utility, derived by their
own consumption, the number of children they have, and their quality. When parents start to invest
massively in the education of their offspring, growth rates rise. Once incomes are high enough,
fertility falls, leading to yet more investment in child quality. In this model, human capital and
growth are basically identical. Lucas (2002) extends the Becker et al. approach by adding a land-
using sector with diminishing returns, and a modern sector where human capital enters linearly. In
the Malthusian trap, there is no investment in human capital. One of the main strengths of the
“unified theory” of Galor and Weil is that their model actually predicts that in the first stages of the
Industrial Revolution the role of human capital is modest, because the rate of technological progress
initially is driven by size, not by quality (Galor, 2005). Yet, while it is consistent with the facts, it
is not the only model and tale that can be told that predicts this.  
Once the Industrial Revolution has taken place, there is ample investment; growth surges, and
fertility rates decline. Both types of model offer no good explanation for how the switch from one
regime to the other might happen. What they share is the assumption that investment in human
capital through the rearing of “higher-quality” (i.e., better-educated) children is an input into the
process of technological change. This, in and of itself, is not an obvious truism. The technology of
the Industrial Revolution was surely not the single creation of a few mechanical giants in the hero-
worshipping traditions of Victorian writers such as Samuel Smiles, but neither was it a popular mass-
movement. It was brought about by a technological elite of inventors, engineers, mechanics and
skilled craftsmen, whose dexterity and ingenuity was critical. Not only new ideas, but also the ability
to implement them, turn blueprints into functioning designs and maintain and operate them
effectively were central. Yet none of those involved more than a small minority of the labor force.
For the rest of the population, as we shall see below, the links between human capital, skills, and
growth are thus far a matter more of convenient modelling and speculation than of historical fact.
For the period before 1850, there is little evidence to support human-capital based approaches and
an increase in the rate of return on human capital due to the acceleration of technological progress.
Skill premia are flat or declining (Clark 2003). The models by Lucas and by Becker et al. seem
geared towards the developments after 1850, when fertility began to decline in earnest in some
European countries. They have little to say about developments before the middle of the eighteenth
century, when a number of countries appear to have cast off Malthusian constraints. 
At least some of the assumptions of the model emphasizing the quality-quantity trade-off and
the rather abrupt transition to quality need to be reevaluated in view of the historical evidence. One
doubt that arises is whether investment in quality before 1800, too, was intensive in parent-time. The
main form that training took was apprenticeship, in which a contract been the trainee and the master
involved an indenture, a commitment by the trainee to work during his learning period, and at times
cash payments (Humphries, 2003). Secondly, there is no doubt that some forms of human capital
(such as literacy and numeracy) were on the rise long before the Industrial Revolution. In part this
was due to the Reformation, in part due to slowly rising incomes (children’s quality was a normal
good), and possibly to a rising demand for literacy in the service sector during an age in which
commerce and finance were growing rapidly. To complicate matters, during the Industrial
Revolution, literacy rates were probably largely stagnant; there is little evidence of an increase in
the returns to education before 1850 (Schofield 1973, Clark 2003).  Measuring literacy rates in a
consistent and comparable fashion is no minor matter, especially with the kind of pre-1800 sources25
24The authors argue that their indicator of human capital accumulation is a good predictor of subsequent growth. Baten
and Van Zanden 2006.
available for this matter. Baten and van Zanden recently examined book production in early modern
Europe. They find a veritable explosion of output per capita after the invention of moveable type,
with production increasing between tenfold and a hundredfold. The Netherlands and the UK are far
ahead of other countries – the richest areas consumed the largest number of books.
24 A recent
literature survey, focusing on the ability to sign one’s name in around 1800, rates this proportion at
about 60 percent for British males and 40 percent for females, more or less at a par with Belgium,
slightly better than France but worse than the Netherlands and Germany (Reis, 2005, p. 202).
However, Britain was considerably richer than those countries, and if we allow for the fact that
literacy was in part a desirable good that people consumed more of when they became richer,
Britain’s lack of advantage in literacy is all the more striking (Mitch, 1992, 1999). Its ability or
willingness to educate its young did not appreciably improve during the years of the Industrial
Revolution. School enrollment rates did not increase much before the 1870s (Flora et al 1993).
The main conclusion has to be that, while human-capital based approaches hold some
attractions for the period after 1850, few growth models have much to say about the first escape from
the negative-feedback low growth regime that survives contact with the most basic facts in economic
history. Exogenous growth models, where they emphasize institutional constraints, hold greater
promise, even if the messy detail of historical reality is proving hard to press into the Procrustian
structure of some modelling approaches. 
 
f. Factories and the re-organization of production [To be completed]
[ What is not quite clear is how we should interpret the rise of the factory system in the context of
changing relative costs for moving ideas, products, and people. The greater value and complexity
of machinery, and a consequent need to supervise workers, were probably important factors in the
rise of the factory system. Clark (1994) argued that the strict discipline of the factory offered a way
to overcome workers’ own inertia – to pre-commitment to working hard and long when they would
otherwise be tempted to take time off. Even if this factor explained the workers’ willingness to
submit to factory discipline, it is not clear if it helps us to explain why the factory system arose when
it did. Mokyr (2001) tells a story about the relative benefits of cottage-shop production,
manufactories, and factories from a transaction cost perspective. He argues that the rise of factories
came about as a result of more interdependent production modes, where piece rates could not work
as well because the marginal product of workers was harder to assess, and because of the flow-
character of production (with the pace being set centrally by the manager). This was the case in some
industries; in others, notably textiles, factories rose along with piece rate payments, making it all the
more puzzling why workers could not rent equipment from factory owners.]  
g. Was an Industrial Revolution Inevitable?
Growth before 1850 was, more often than not, a fleeting phenomenon. There were many “false26
starts” and stops - periods of rapid growth followed by stagnation and decline (Braudel 1973;
Goldstone, 2001). It is at least doubtful that there was much about Britain in 1700 that guaranteed
that the next episode of rapid growth would not end like earlier ones. Both economic historians and
growth theorists are ambiguous about the inevitability of the Industrial Revolution and the role of
chance. One group emphasizes the role of historical accident both in terms of timing and location.
Crafts (1977) argued that accidental factors, and not systematic advantages, were crucial -- that
France, for example, could have easily industrialized first had it not been for a number of random
factors. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) build a probabilistic model of the Industrial Revolution where
technology adoption depends on the realization of shocks. Lucas (1998) adds a sudden, one-off
increase in returns to human capital to his model to produce an Industrial Revolution, which could
be interpreted as reflecting historical accident. Jones (2001) presents a unified growth model where
change is driven by the interaction between ideas and population size. He argues that property rights
improved in a major way in the 20
th century, and adds this to his simulations. This has the result of
accelerating the Industrial Revolution by centuries. While some kind of transition to self-sustaining
growth is inevitable in his model, its timing is heavily influenced by exogenous variations in the
institutions protecting property rights. 
In contrast, both economic historians and growth theorists have argued that there is little role for
historical accident. In models such as those by Galor-Weil (1998) and Hansen-Prescott (2002), given
a certain set of starting values, an Industrial Revolution is inevitable. The dynamics governing
growth from the earliest date ensure that there has to be an eventual acceleration. While many
economic historians will be sceptical about this particular feature because of its post hoc ergo
propter hoc qualities, there is a school of thought that has defended such an approach. David Landes,
(1994), responding to Crafts’s argument that Britain’s role as the First Industrial Nation may have
arisen by chance, has argued that big events need big causes. In his view, both the Industrial
Revolution and Britain’s role in it were determined by that country’s starting conditions. Yet there
is no contradiction between the argument that big events need big causes and that the Industrial
Revolution was not pre-ordained from the start. Some accidents, such as the destruction of the
Spanish Armada in 1588, may have been fairly “big.”  At some critical junctures of history, a point
of bifurcation may have occurred, and that accidental factors may have steered economies on one
path or another; once on that path, their direction was clearly no longer accidental.
As noted earlier, of all the possible historical paths, we only observe one. It is easy enough to
imagine that it could have looked different, but how different? What appears to underpin theorists
and historians’ interest in the role of accident are the wide differences in the fate of individual
countries, and the many promising starts that never led to a “take-off” into self-sustaining growth
– more often than not, before the transistion “from Malthus to Solow” occurred, there were many
episodes of a long and stony path “from Malthus to Malthus.” The inability of many modern growth
models to explain cross-sectional variations in economic performance has left some economic
historians sceptical (Crafts 1995). If progress is to be made, theorists should aim to offer models that
have something to say about the factors that influenced adoption probabilities for new technologies
in the past, and they ought to assign an explicit role to chance; ideally, they should also offer
quantitative answers to question how much the individual features of a country influenced
industrialization probabilities. 
4. Growth and the emergence of the “new economy”27
25Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith’s contemporary noted in 1767 that “Many mechanical arts require no capacity ...
ignorance is the mother of industry as well as superstition... Manufactures, accordingly, prosper most where the mind is least
consulted.” 
Models in the Lucas, Becker, and Galor et al. tradition offer a unified and consistent account of
the transition into self-sustaining, rapid growth of per capita incomes. They are ultimately driven by
human capital accumulation. More rapid technological change (either exogenously given, or as a
result of larger population size) increases the returns to human capital. Parents respond by producing
higher-quality offspring. Additional human capital input in the economy boosts growth and
accelerates  technological change yet further. Because parents respond to the changes in the quantity-
quality-tradeoff, fertility declines. Hence growth becomes intensive rather than extensive, boosting
incomes and not population size. In this section, we examine each of these facets in turn – the
importance of human capital for growth in the emergence of the 19
th century’s “new economy”, and
the importance of quantity-quality tradeoffs for fertility change. We then discuss what determined
the accumulation of useful knowledge.
a. Education and the first “new economy”
One factor that is common to models in the Lucas tradition is that they predict an increase in the
demand for human capital during the transition to self-sustaining growth – and that technological
change should be heavily skill-biased. This is historically problematic. There seems to be little
correlation between widespread literacy and schooling and the onset of technological progress.
Mitch’s (1998) view has been that, if anything, nineteenth century Britain was overeducated. By this
he means that the amount of human capital exceeded that which was needed by the demand for
production. Reading and writing were desirable in their own right, that is, as consumption goods,
and were not just parts of an investment process in which the rate of return on the margin would
equal to interest rate. It is far from clear that the main developments in manufacturing during the
Industrial Revolution, or even developments in its aftermath, depended heavily on an increase in
human capital, as conventionally measured. Possibly, administrative tasks became more important,
and the rise in pay rates for highly literate workers observed by Boot (1999) suggests that there were
some (small) parts of the economy where formal education may have paid off. Yet technological
change itself was probably not skill-biased in the normal sense of using large quantities of literate
workers with many years of formal schooling. Research on the output of textile workers in New
England showed that only experience was a good predictor of output; the ability to read or write was
neither useful in its own right, nor did it go hand-in-hand with other, unobserved characteristics that
would have raised output (Leunig 2001).
Many contemporaries commented on the de-skilling that accompanied the Industrial
Revolution.
25 In the textile industry, the cotton mules, spinning jennies and Arkwright frames
replaced skilled labor with a mixture of capital and unskilled labor. In some cases, innovation
deliberately sought to replace the skilled “labor aristocracy” whose bargaining power the cotton
masters resented (especially in the case of mule-spinners). High wages of skilled mule spinners
outside Britain apparently acted as a strong incentive to adopt ring spinning, which could be28
26 Galor 2006, private communication.
performed by unskilled labor (Leunig 2003). In Britain itself, and despite some inherent technical
limitations, highly skilled mule spinners were cheap enough to make the industry competitive all the
way up to 1914. All this suggests that neither formal-education based indicators of skills nor the
nature of technological change offer decisive support to the predictions of unified growth theory.
However, the current state of knowledge on skill-bias of 19
th century technological change is far
from complete. Perhaps if one could construct input-output tables with human capital as a separate
input, when linked with more data on the schooling and skills of the workforce, these could help to
shed more light on many of the crucial issues. Such a project, conducted for a number of European
countries and the US in the 19
th century, could help scholars construct more detailed estimates of the
embodied skill content of production and the extent to which this changed over time. 
One indicator of the changing role of skills is the skill premium. Unfortunately, our knowledge
of the behavior of the skill premium over time is very incomplete, because estimates are based on
a few skilled occupations, which may not be representative. Moreover, the skill premium is a
reduced form measure, and changes in it could reflect any combination of changing supply and/or
demand factors. Williamson (1985) claimed to show that the skill premium surged until 1850 in
Britain, and declined thereafter. The consensus view amongst economic historians does not accept
the Williamson interpretation. As Feinstein (1988)  convincingly demonstrated, there is no clear
evidence that skill premia changed at all over time. This is problematic for authors such as Doepke
and Zilibotti (2005), who argue that child labor laws were introduced in England after wage
inequality surged. In their model, the political equilibrium that sustains restrictions on child labor
require a substantial premium for well-educated members of the workforce. In this way, there is an
institutional response to the voracious demand for human capital. Unfortunately, Doepke and
Zilibotti reliance on Williamson’s flawed data undermines the credibility of their results. Galor
offers an explanation why skill premia failed to rise in 19
th century Britain. He argues that, after the
introduction of compulsory schooling, supply was so ample that premia remained flat.
26 This would
offer a plausible interpretation if skill premia had increased prior to the introduction of the Factory
Acts. Yet this is exactly the key piece of the puzzle that is missing. 
Most of the skills that this elite of workers brought to the factories were the culmination of a
century-long accumulation of expertise in traditional crafts. If the rise of new technology, and the
high complementarity of their skills with the adoption of more productive machinery, made their
human capital more valuable, we should find changes in the wage premium for this group. One con-
ceptually appealing test of human-capital based models of the Industrial Revolution would focus on
movements in the pay rate of this labor aristocracy, compared to the rest, and on the supply response
that these differences in pay engendered. The failure of traditionally measured skill premia to show
a rise may well mask an increasing polarization within the workforce, with industrialization raising
the returns to supervisory and advanced mechanical skills, and reducing those for standard ones
(such as blacksmithing and weaving). If there is one area that shows promise for future work, it is
the acquisition of factory- and task-specific skills. Steep experience-based earnings profiles in the
textile industry apparently made acquiring skills attractive. During their early years, when unskilled
workers such as brickmakers were better paid, workers were effectively investing their own human
capital of a highly specific kind; by age 35, they could look forward to earning 2.3 times the wages29
27 Coal miners are arguably a better standard of comparison, since the wage of textile operatives will also reflect
differences in the harshness of working conditions – and since those in coal mines were probably worse than in textile factories,
skill accumulation is a good explanation.
28 The latter effect would be in the spirit of Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) paper, which sees the extension of the
franchise as a reaction to revolutionary threats. A similar argument could possibly be made about the introduction of
compulsory schooling. 
29This insight is hardly indebted to modern theory: Karl Marx, in a famous passage, cites an industrialist telling the
economist Nassau Senior that “if a labourer lays down his spade, he renders useless, for that period, a capital worth 18 pence.
When one of our people leaves the mill, he renders useless a capital that has cost £100,000” Marx (1967, Vol. I, pp. 405–06).
of a brickmaker, and still more than a coal miner (Boot 1995).
27 However, the total number of
workers investing in their own skills was sufficient to keep overall premia for, say, skilled mule
spinners, relatively low in England at the end of the 19
th century (Leunig 2003). One valid test of the
human-capital approach would focus on highly skilled workers such as the textile operatives
examined by Boot and Leunig, and to ask – did they receive greater rewards for investing in their
skills (by accepting years of poorly paid on-the-job training) than, say, apprentices in traditional
sectors?
For the time being, the jury appears to be out on whether increased human capital formation from
the middle of the nineteenth century onwards was an endogenous response to changes in factor
prices and other economic incentives, whether it was a result of higher real incomes (education for
one’s children being a normal consumption good),  or whether if it reflects “exogenous” shifts in the
supply of education, such as the long-delayed effect of the enlightenment, of nineteenth-century
nationalism and nation-building, or attempts to increase social control over the lower classes.
28 Since
compulsory schooling played a crucial role in raising human capital, examining the history of their
introduction becomes crucial. Galor and Moav offer a first, innovative step in this direction. They
analyse voting records in the House of Commons, and argue that the educational reforms that came
into force as a result of the Balfour Act of 1902 largely reflected the interests of capitalists in
improving workers’ education. 
b. The human capital that mattered: Factory discipline, supervision, and the skills for
microinventions 
Standard growth regressions for the 20
th century measure human capital as some (earnings-
weighted) average of years of schooling. Like all measurements, this is nothing but a convenient
shortcut. It is entirely possible that it works better for the present than the past, and that the skills that
mattered in the 19
th century are poorly captured by calculating school attendance rates. The rise of
the factory system required plenty of highly specialized skills that are not necessarily transmitted
through formal schooling – discipline, punctuality, and technical prowess. 
The equipment and materials used by workers belonged to the capitalist and were costly. Factory
owners needed to install into workers a culture of loyalty, punctuality, and sobriety. They wanted
to foster a culture of loyalty and respect, a willingness to take instructions from and cooperate with
other workers. This is a direct result of the expensive equipment in factories.
29 Wage premia for
disciplined work in the factories were high vis-a-vis other, more self-determined forms of30
employment, and the factory system’s profitability relied crucially on work intensity (Pollard, 1965;
Clark 1994). For the same reasons, monitoring workers was a highly important task. If “discipline
capital” mattered more for the first Industrial Revolution than education, conventionally measured,
economic historians should compile more comprehensive wage measures that capture the rewards
for workers who successfully internalized the demands of the machine age. Also, if the returns to
disciplining workers were large, we should find high and rising pay premia for outstanding foremen
and other members of the evolving hierarchies that ensured the smooth running of 19
th century
factories. The most obvious testable implication of this idea that early factory owners should have
a preference for the employment of comparatively more pliable workers, even if they were of low
skill — i.e., women and children. This was very much the case in the early stages of the textile mills.
In an important sense, the Industrial Revolution was carried not by the skills of the average or
modal worker, but by the ingenuity and technical ability of a relative few. This is not a return to the
“heroic inventors” of the Victorian era. We should recognize, however, that the new technology was
generated by a small army of highly skilled men. A few were  great engineers, but these could hardly
have succeeded without a much larger contingent of skilled artisans and mechanics, upon whose
dexterity and adroitness the top inventors and thus Britain's technological success relied. These were
the craftsmen, highly skilled clock- and instrument makers, woodworkers, toymakers, glasscutters,
and similar specialists, who could accurately produce the parts, using the correct dimensions and
materials, who could read blueprints and compute velocities, understood tolerance, resistance,
friction, and the interdependence of mechanical parts. These anonymous but capable workers were
the essential complement to the inventors, since they were the ones that turned models and designs
into working machinery, maintained and operated it, and produced a cumulative torrent of small,
incremental, but cumulatively indispensable microinventions, without which Britain would not have
become the "workshop of the world." They comprised perhaps five percent of the labor force. This
would put their counts in the tens of thousands but not in the millions. 
c. The quality-quantity tradeoff and the demographic transition
Human-capital based models of long-run growth assign a crucial role to the fertility transition.
It is normally modelled as a response to changing economic incentives. The predictions are that (i)
skill premia surged, (ii) parents responded to this change in the trade-off between child quantity and
quality by limiting fertility. As we saw, the first part of this argument is problematic – returns to
human capital, conventionally measured, probably did not increase significantly before 1870. The
second one will probably also have to be modified. Since the economic benefits of formal education
were probably minor for working class employment, any model of parental fertility choice based on
quality-quantity tradeoffs faces problems. What is more plausible is to argue that the costs of child
quantity increased in the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of compulsory schooling
laws. Doepke (2004) argues that other government policies (such as education subsidies) could not
have had a similarly large influence. Yet we do not know that government intervention was crucial
in moving children out of the factories and into the classrooms. For the US, there is some evidence
that state schooling laws had little influence on child labor (Moehling 1999). In the UK, Kirby
(1999) argued that child labor laws came in at the same time when technological change made the
use of children in mining much less useful, and that there was not much of a  causal role for31
30Chesnais 1992.
government legislation in reducing employment rates. 
If the importance of government intervention is confirmed, examining the economic and other
factors behind the adoption of child labor laws becomes crucial. What is also missing is convincing
evidence that higher net costs of child rearing (principally through lower employment opportunities)
were important in reducing fertility. There are no cohort-specific studies of fertility behavior at the
micro level that would unambiguously identify the impact of discontinuous changes in schooling
laws and the like. Wrigley and Schofield’s famous Population History of England is based on family
reconstitutions that focus on rural parishes, and their data end in 1837. We have little information
on what determined completed fertility rates, educational investment, age at marriage and the like
in the industrializing cities of the North. More detailed demographic analysis of the fertility choices
of the working class – combined with information on rates of school attendance etc. prior to and after
the introduction of the compulsory schooling laws – could do much to further our understanding of
how robust the empirical foundations of human-capital led interpretations of the Industrial
Revolution  are. 
The history of fertility decline represents a further challenge to unified growth theory, and to
much of economic demography. Little if any of the changes predicted by standard models such as
in Becker and Barro (1987) are in line with historical facts. Most of the fertility decline was
concentrated in a few decades, starting in 1870 and accelerating after 1890. In general – with
important exceptions such as in the case of France – mortality declines preceded the fall in fertility
by decades (Lee 2003, Coale and Watkins 1986). In some countries, such as the UK, Germany,
Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and Belgium, there were sustained and sometimes marked
increases in fertility before decline set in. For example, the average number of children per woman
rose from 4.5 to 5.5 in the Netherlands between 1850 and 1880. By 1900, it had returned to its earlier
level. In most European countries, the first significant reductions in fertility occurred after the 1880s,
long after industrial change had started to take hold on the continent. Some countries saw large
declines in infant mortality before fertility started to decline (Sweden, Belgium, Denmark); in others,
both series show a concurrent downward movement (France, Germany, Netherlands).
30  Differences
in levels are equally puzzling: Swiss, Belgian and Swedish birth rates around 1850 were on the order
of 30 per 1000, whereas in the Netherlands, Austria and Germany these were around 35 per
thousand.
Finding an economic reason for fertility decline has not been easy, and there is currently no
consensus on the principal contributing factors (Alter 1992). The biggest project on the fertility
transition, the Princeton European Fertility Project (EFL), concluded that there was no clear link
between socio-economic factors and fertility change. Instead, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural
factors appeared to be dominant (Coale and Watson 1986). The economic value of children, as far
as it can be determined, did not change in such a way as to help in explaining the decline in fertility
rates (Knodel and van deWalle 1986). The leading explanation for fertility change is the “diffusion
model”, where knowledge about prophylactic techniques spread along linguistic lines. The principal
reason why scholars have accepted the findings of the EFL is the remarkable similarity in the timing32
31As Cleland and Wilson (1987) argue: “...the simultaneity and speed of the European transition makes it highly
doubtful that any economic force could be found which was powerful enough to offer a reasonable explanation". 
32A much larger research project on German fertility decline is now under way (Ogilvie et al. 2005), using that
country’s extraordinarily rich data sources. 
of the transition.
31
Studies that go beyond the broad aggregates and look at regional data from, for example, a single
European state such as Bavaria, have sometimes reached different conclusions (Brown and Guinnane
2002), assigning a greater role to the opportunity cost of women’s time, while at the same time also
documenting the effect of other factors such as religion and political affiliation. The statistical basis
for some of the EFP’s conclusions may be less robust than had previously been assumed.
32
Independent of whether new, more disaggregated studies can find a role for economic factors in
fertility change, the very simultaneity of the drop in reproduction rates across Europe makes it
unlikely that economic factors can ever be assigned a dominant role. Exogenous, non-economic
factors probably dominated in the great decline of European fertility. This need not present a
challenge to all growth models. Yet for the more ambitious class of structural models in the unified
growth tradition, it is a challenge that there are so few economic factors that have a clear bearing on
fertility outcomes.
d. What sustained growth: science, technology, and “useful knowledge”
One organizing concept that has proven hard to model formally but without which no historically
accurate picture of modern growth can be formed is the connection between science and technology
in the Industrial Revolution and beyond. Historical scholarship has bifurcated here into a minority
view, which continue to view science and scientific culture as crucial to the Industrial Revolution
(Musson and Robinson, 1969; Jacob, 1997) and a majority, which has dismissed the role of science
as epiphenomenal and marginal (Mathias, 1979; Hall, 1974; Gillispie, 1980). Examples of the
importance of science and mathematics to some of the inventions of the Industrial Revolution can
certainly be amassed. It is equally true, however, that many of most the prominent breakthroughs
in manufacturing, especially in the mechanical processing of textiles were not based on much more
science than Archimedes knew, and that in other areas of progress, such as steam power and animal
breeding, progress occurred on the basis of trial and error, not a deep understanding of the
underlying physical and biological processes.
 The debate between those who feel that science played a pivotal role in the Industrial Revolution
and those who do not is more than a hackneyed dispute between a glass that is half full or half
empty, because the glass started from almost empty and slowly filled in the century and half after
1750. Scientists and science (not quite the same thing) had a few spectacular successes in developing
new production techniques, above all the chlorine bleaching technique, and  the inventions made by
such natural philosophers as Franklin, Priestley, Davy, and Rumford. While the Industrial
Revolution in its classical form might well have occurred, with a few exceptions, without much
progress, it is hard to argue that it would have transformed into a continent-wide process of growth
without a growing body of useful knowledge on which inventors and technicians could draw. It is
not possible to “date” the time at which this kind of collaboration began. In some areas it can already33
33In Germany, universities had increasingly to compete with the technical colleges or Technische Hochschule, the first
of which was set up in Karlsruhe in 1825. In France new grandes écoles were set up to provide more practical education such as
the  arts et métiers in 1804, 
been discerned in the mid eighteenth century. It is equally clear, however, that in the crucial “new”
areas of technology in the post 1820 years, scientific knowledge became increasingly important to
the development of new technology. Two of the most remarkable developments of the era, the
telegraph and the growing understanding of fatty acids in chemicals take place in the final decades
of the classical Industrial Revolution. Trial and error, serendipity, and sheer intuition never quite
disappear from the scene, but the ability to know more about how and why a technique works makes
it far easier to refine and debug a new technique quickly, adapt it to other uses, and come up with
variations and recombinations that would not have occurred otherwise. In chemicals, steel,
electricity, food processing, power engineering, agriculture, and shipbuilding technology, to name
but a few, the ties between formally educated who tried to understand the natural phenomena and
regularities they observed and the people whose livelihood depended 
The underlying institutions that made this growing collaboration possible have been investigated
at great length. Although IPR’s sure were of some importance, they cannot possibly explain the
entire process, as we have seen. Instead a deeper and more encompassing social phenomenon was
at play here, namely a growing interaction flows of information and interaction between people who
made things (entrepreneurs and engineers) and people who knew things. Not only that this
interaction meant that the best that useful knowledge had to offer was accessible to those who could
make best use of it, it also meant that the agenda of science was increasingly biased toward the
practical needs of the economy. The bridges between savants and fabricants took many forms, from
written technical manuals and treatises, to academies and scientific societies, where they rubbed
shoulders and exchanged ideas. By the closing decades of the eighteenth century it was normal for
scientists to consult to manufacturers looking for improved bleaches or more efficient engines. 
By 1815, the need for this kind of collaboration had become a consensus, and the European
economies competed with one another in encouraging them. In Britain, the Society of Arts,
established in 1764, the Royal Institution, founded in 1799, and the Mechanics Institutes (first
established by George Birkbeck in 1804 were examples of how private initiatives would carry out
this task in the land where people believed above all in private initiatives. Less formal institutions
abounded, the most famous of all being the Birmingham Lunar Society, which brought together the
top scientists with some of kits most prominent entrepreneurs and engineers. Less well known but
equally significant were the Spitalfields Mathematical Society, founded in 1717, and  the London
Chapter Coffee House, the favorite of the fellows of the Royal Society in the 1780s, where learned
men discussed at great length the mundane issues of steam and chemistry(Levere and Turner, 2002).
In France, Germany, and the Low Countries, government took a more active role in bringing this
about (e.g. Lenoir, 1998). Not all of those efforts were unqualified successes: the engineers of the
Paris École Polytechnique were often too abstract and formal in their research to yield immediate
results. In Germany, the University system was on the whole rather conservative and resisted the
practical applications that governments expected of them. New and more effective institutions were
established, however, and the old ones eventually reformed.
33  The decades after 1815, then, were
the ultimate triumph of the Baconian vision, that formed the basis for the founding of the Royal
Society in 1660. The hopes and aspirations of men like Thomas Sprat and Robert Hooke were slowly34
34Abramovitz and David 1973; Feinstein 1978.
becoming reality. To achieve this triumph, Europe had to undergo  changes in its institutional set-up
of the accumulation and dissemination of useful knowledge, yet these institutions were based on the
scaffolds (to use North’s term) of an Enlightenment ideology that firmly believed in material
progress and advocated concrete programs as to how to bring it about.
 
e. Capital and the rise of new forms of business organization
Growth in the 19
th century relied heavily on capital investment. Savings as a share of national
income increased in the UK after 1750. They had to – to equip the ever larger cohorts entering the
workforce with machines and buildings, with a roof over their heads and shovels in their hands,
savings had to increase. Eventually, as population growth rates declined, these high savings rates
started to increase capital available per member of the workforce. Much of the post 1850 growth was
driven by capital deepening. Calculated as a simple residual, not much tended to be left for the role
of TFP, of output change not driven by more capital or more labor.
34 That is why Abramovitz and
David (1973), in their review of US economic history during the 19
th and 20
th centuries, spoke of the
“rise of TFP” over the period.
There is substantial agreement that the standard assumptions about the separability of capital and
technological change are too facile. One way to go beyond the standard Cobb-Douglas function in
growth accounting was explored by Crafts (2004), who examined the change in the relative cost of
capital that made adoption easier. In the standard TFP framework, we would attribute the  economic
effect of this demand response entirely to "more capital", which to some extent will be "better and
cheaper capital". The element that Crafts captures is that "more capital" only became affordable
because of technological change. The method, pioneered by Oliner and Sichel (2000), simply adds
the capital deepening in the new "revolutionizing" sector to the TFP estimate, thus deriving the total
contribution of technological change. In many subperiods, the results are dramatic. For 1830-60, for
example, adding capital deepening in railways implies that the role of technological change was
eight times larger than previously calculated. It should be noted that there is now an upward- instead
of downward-bias in the TFP calculations, since the underlying assumption is that without
technological change, there would have been no investment in transport whatsoever – which is
unlikely to be true, imperfect as early models were. Long after the railroad were introduced, horses
remained the staple source of transportation power.
Allen (2005) goes beyond the Cobb-Douglas production function altogether, and uses a translog
production function for industrializing Britain instead. He calibrates a model for the UK in the
eighteenth century, and finds it to have very low elasticities of substitution in factor inputs; the
production function is almost Leontief. The implication then is that almost all capital accumulation
is driven by technological change – without the chance to put new machinery in place, Britain would
not have invested more in additional capital goods. Allen couples this setup with one where
technological change drives up profits, which are then reinvested. Somewhat unsurprisingly, given
the extreme nature of the production function’s parameters, technological change now accounts for
basically all of the output gains after 1700. It is difficult to understand why more capital would have35
been "useless" in the absence of technological progress – few observers would agree that the
marginal return to more capital in the UK economy in 1700 would have been essentially zero. While
there is no agreement yet on how to model and calculate the interaction between capital deepening
and technological progress, it is clear that new capital goods put in place partly to equip the larger
cohorts were also better. Technological progress raised the marginal product of capital, while capital
goods embodied much of the new technology. This complementarity between capital and
technological progress is central to the historical development of the British economy. 
Hand-in-hand with a greater role for capital in the economy at large went changes in business
organizations. Textile firms were typically small in size; Lancashire had thousands of spinning and
weaving firms, all competing vigorously with each other (Leunig 2003). Large-scale production
units had not been unknown altogether before 1800 (Mokyr 2001). Factories started to replace the
putting-out system of home production gradually, and both forms of organization existed side-by-
side for a long time. Yet the minimum efficient size of steel production, of chemicals plants and
electrical engineering units in during the “Second Industrial Revolution” dwarfed anything that went
before it. One school of business historians has written about industrial development as the history
of the rise of big business (Chandler 1990). Lamoreaux, Raff and Temin (2003) have argued that we
should understand changes in business organization as a response to changing transport and
information costs, in the tradition of Coase and Oliver Williamson. 
h. Institutions and the new economy: factory acts, child labor acts, public education
i. Political reform,  and complementarity of human and physical capital
j. Summary36
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